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Shuangge Wen and Jingchen Zhao assess how established theories on corporate governance have stood 




   ·     Three key theories -- the agency theory, stewardship theory and path dependence theory 
have served to explain the relationship between directors and shareholders in the field of cor-
porate governance. However, none of the theories alone have stood the test of the global fi-
nancial crisis. 
 
   ·     Given the multiplicity and complexity of directors' interests, directors in organisations are 
likely to have agency relationships with some managers and stewardship relationships with 
others. 
 
   ·     Path dependence theory indicates the prevalence of voluntary codes rather than man-
datory instruments in the post-crisis context. 
 
   ·     In the authors' opinion, a combination of voluntary codes and mandatory instruments 




Following the bursting of the housing bubble in 2006, a dramatic rise in defaults on subprime mortgages in 
the financial market triggered a global credit crunch and the subsequent financial crisis. The world economy 
has been seriously damaged by the recent financial turmoil. Stock markets have crashed worldwide; retail 
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sales have suffered huge declines; banks and investment institutions have suffered billions in losses and 
faced risks of failure; and markets became dysfunctional. 
A cyclical pattern of rises and declines in the business world has been perceived since the dawn of industrial 
capitalism,1 and has created new demands for governance leading to according changes in governing rules 
and regulations. Although no consensus has so far been achieved as regards the implications of the 2008 
crisis, the increasing significance of corporate governance practices has again been highlighted. Needs for 
improvement not only derive from failures of management, but from the incompetency of the boards and 
shareholders in ensuring corporate accountability. 
'A multi-theoretical approach to corporate governance is essential for recognising the many mechanisms and 
structures that might reasonably enhance organisational functioning ...' (authors' emphasis added).2 This ar-
ticle considers how established theories on corporate governance have stood the test in the recent turmoil 




Originating in the 1970s in the field of finance and economics, agency theory has developed as a predomi-
nant theoretical support for shareholder value orientation. Agents (the directors) manage the business for the 
benefit of their principals (the shareholders) and ensure accountability through a single-purposed govern-
ance structure.3 As residual claimants, shareholders are regarded as principals and the most suitable candi-
dates to monitor managerial performance in terms of assigned powers and duties.4 The traditional agency 
relationship was between shareholders and management, although a double agency relationship, ie, the re-
lationship between shareholders and directors, and that between directors and management, is increasingly 
recognised. 
Agency theory rests upon the separation of ownership and management, but whilst this has resulted in effi-
ciency, it has also been largely blamed for the instability of the Anglo-American governance mechanism. On 
the one hand, the nature of separation enables corporations to acquire substantial amounts of capital from 
various sources; provides investors with direct and flexible exit choices from their investee companies; and it 
largely promotes market competition and development. On the other hand, it causes potential conflict be-
tween principals and agents. Directors are presumed under agency theory to be imperfect, self-interested 
agents. They are tempted to engage in opportunistic behaviour for their own personal benefit, rather than 
undertake proper risk management for the benefit of their principals, who prefer to maximise their returns 
through the taking of rational corporate risk, and focusing on high dividends and stock prices. 
In practice shareholders' insufficient control over directors' performance is regarded as a significant element 
contributing to the divergence of interests between principals and agents. This problem is exacerbated when 
portfolios are diversified, which significantly reduces shareholders' incentives to supervise and arguably in-
centivises them to leave.5 Information asymmetry also restricts the shareholder group's ability to make quali-
fied decisions in response to directors' decisions -- so that in practice directors are offered opportunities for 
diverging from shareholders' interests and pursuing their own objectives. 
 
AGENCY PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE CRISIS 
 
With the plethora of economic declines triggered by the financial crisis, the limitations of agency theory -- a 
divergence of interests between agents and principals -- has again been manifest through both the unac-
countability of the directors and insufficient control exerted by the shareholders. As recognised by Rose, the 
financial crisis is regarded in some respects as a failure of corporate governance mostly owing to managerial 
expropriation and high agency costs.6 
 
DIRECTORS' LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Premised on the belief that directors are self-interested and opportunistic, agency theory has focused on how 
shareholders can reduce the likelihood of directors misusing their power for pecuniary or other advantages.7 
For Anglo-American corporations and institutions, the two key mechanisms for achieving this are account-
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ability and risk management. Accordingly, the board of directors, defined as 'the link between the sharehold-
ers of the firm and the management entrusted with undertaking the day-to-day operations of the organisa-
tion',8 are expected to fulfil their basic fiduciary duty by quickly responding to evolving risks to the business,9 
conducting effective risk management and 'supervising the management of the business and reporting to 
shareholders on their stewardship.'10 
In the financial crisis, the lack of accountability within corporations and financial institutions and between di-
rectors and their principals was identified as a major failing in the realm of corporate governance.11 It has 
been found that many directors of collapsed financial institutions failed to devote sufficient time or effort to 
risk management, or to fully understand the business and the product risks.12 Instead of arranging loans and 
managing relevant risks themselves, these financial institutions (and their directors) played the role of 'origi-
nator and distributor',13 ie they sold their loan risks to other investors in the form of a bundle of credit prod-
ucts, on the grounds that risks associated with the loan debt would be fragmented and risk monitoring would 
not be necessary.14 Such actions also increased the intricacy of corporate disclosure, and further decreased 
accountability, both from directors to shareholders, and from managers to directors. In the case of Northern 
Rock, directors' insufficient risk monitoring of their invested products, and their behaviour in misleading small 
investors into buying shares while it was going into financial difficulty, are regarded as basic accountability 
failures. In the recent governance report produced by UBS, incomplete risk control methodologies were iden-
tified as the primary cause of Northern Rock's governance failure. 
 
INSUFFICIENT SHAREHOLDER CONTROL 
 
'The key question that shareholders and their agents needed to ask themselves was whether they were 
partly responsible for the banking crisis.'15 Though shareholder control is defined by agency theorists as an 
efficient way of eliminating the diversion of interests between shareholders and managers and managerial 
greed, in practice shareholders have played an inactive role and it is this inactivity in corporate control, par-
ticularly the inefficient role of institutional investors in restraining the reckless behaviour of boards, that has 
been identified as a key factor in contributing to the escalation of the crisis. 
Much of the inactivity can be blamed on the dilution of share ownership -- a consequence, according to 
agency theory, of the separation of ownership and control in modern corporations. The largest individual 
share ownerships amount to just a minor percentage of the total shareholding, and it is therefore not possible 
for these shareholders to exercise direct control of corporate management.16 In the Northern Rock case, 
144,000 of the 180,000 shareholders were found to be small investors who did not have sufficient informa-
tion or influence to exercise due diligence in monitoring the board's performance. 
This wide distribution of ownership has rendered Anglo-American shareholders, including institutional inves-
tors, passive in corporate governance. They prefer to exercise their powers via the 'exit' choice, and leave 
market forces eg the threat of hostile takeover, as the main driver for governing corporate management. In 
the case of Northern Rock, it was found that the company's reckless business model had been transparent to 





Stewardship theory provides an alternative to agency theory in interpreting the principal-agent relationship. 
This model advocates the overriding status of shareholders whilst presuming that managers' interests align 
with those of their principals.18 Instead of being characterised as opportunists, as in agency theory, executive 
managers are described in stewardship theory as good stewards of the corporation, with enough 
self-motivation to attain high levels of corporate profit and returns for the shareholders.19 According to stew-
ardship theory these returns for the shareholders are not achieved by placing management under greater 
control from shareowners, but by empowering managers to take autonomous executive action.20 
In contrast to agency theory, stewardship theory suggests that corporate practice should allow ultimate pow-
ers of decision to be delegated to the management.21 The responsibility of the board is not to directly control 
the corporation, but to supervise and assist the Chief Executive Officer ('CEO') and the management in ac-
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complishing their tasks. However, the weakness of the theory is that there is no clear line between the board 
and the management responsibilities, and it is always difficult to hold the CEO (and not the board) account-
able for the results of actions taken. 
In the financial turmoil, the unaccountability of directors and managers indicates a lack of stewardship and 
further suggests the impracticability of offering directors/managers ultimate powers in corporate control. The 
lack of stewardship in governance practice was succinctly described by Greenspan: 'I made a mistake in 
presuming that the self-interest of organisations, specifically banks and others, was such that they were best 
capable of protecting their own shareholders.'22 A governance structure which is framed purely on the basis 
of stewardship is inapplicable in the aftermath of the crisis. Nevertheless, stewardship theory has not been 
completely written off in the post-crisis context, because it effectively complements agency theory. Given the 
multiplicity and complexity of principals' interests, principals in organisations are likely to have agency rela-
tionships with some managers and stewardship relationships with others.23 Most importantly, the emphasis of 
stewardship theory offers a possible explanation for the agency dilemma of governance: although it is agreed 
that executives should remain subject to effective monitoring mechanisms in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis, they cannot submit every decision for the shareholders' consideration due to the nature of corporate 
governance.24 The necessity of enhancing executive stewardship is therefore put forward as an important 
component in the post-crisis governance structure. 
 
SHAREHOLDER VALUE CONTINUATION AND SELF-REGULATION: THE PATH DEPENDENCE PER-
SPECTIVE 
 
A further question arises as to whether the UK's emphasis on shareholder value should transfer to stake-
holders' interests generally (those of employees, creditors, customers, suppliers), to minimise the negative 
effects of short-termism in the financial crisis. Although the significance of stakeholder considerations in en-
hancing long-term corporate culture is increasingly acknowledged, the recent financial crisis suggests the 
impracticality of enforcing the stakeholder model in the UK. The idea that directors should be offered more 
autonomy to provide stakeholder enhancement has been seriously undermined by the fact that insufficient 
control over directors' performance was identified as a major factor contributing to the current crisis. 'When 
the crunch came, profits would come first.'25 When many companies are fighting for survival during the finan-
cial crisis, the implementation of a stakeholder model seems more difficult within the Anglo-American context, 
because such practice by directors could leave them open to accusations of diluting the primary objective of 
companies, ie the maximisation of shareholders' interests. It seems that the interests of non-shareholder 
groups will be considered and pursued by directors purely for instrumental concerns, ie only when such 
stakeholder enhancement would directly and positively contribute to the competitiveness of the company and 
the maximisation of shareholder value.26 
The theory of path dependence offers a strong theoretical support for continuing shareholder value orienta-
tion in the UK post-crisis context. Path dependence, a comparatively new theory originating in the 1980s, 
means that an outcome or decision is shaped in specific and systematic ways by the historical path leading 
to it, as well as by other factors within the socio-economic context.27 As part of the domestic legal and finan-
cial framework, a corporate governance system has significant sources of path dependence, which include 
historical accidents as well as economic and political particulars of the domestic system.28 The persistence of 
these path dependence sources significantly contributes to the stability of the domestic corporate govern-
ance system in any local socio-economic environment. 
Path dependence theory sheds an interesting light on the continuing persistence of the shareholder value 
orientation in the UK. Historically, shareholder value has been deeply embodied in the UK, both in theory and 
in common law practice.29 The main configurations of the UK corporate governance system -- including dis-
persed ownership and ultimate shareholder decision rights, the one-tier board structure, the external moni-
toring system, the liquid market and active market activities -- are all determined by and further solidify the 
ultimate objective of shareholder value maximisation. In recent company law reforms the UK government has 
favoured the Enlightened Shareholder Value ('ESV') principle over the pluralist approach. The major feature 
of the ESV approach is its preservation of the long-established corporate objective of shareholder wealth 
maximisation: the stakeholder consideration required in provisions reflecting the ESV principle, such as s 
172(1) and s 417 of the Companies Act 2006, is merely for the ultimate aim of shareholder benefit. This is 
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distinct from the pluralist approach, which rejects the superiority of shareholders' interests and advocates the 
pursuit of various stakeholder groups' interests. Given the increasing demands to restore investor confidence 
and revitalise the market economy, it is expected that shareholder value will continue to be honoured as the 
predominant goal, and it will clearly be for the ultimate benefit of company members. 
Path dependence theory also indicates the prevalence of the self-regulatory approach after the crisis. Avoid-
ing the rigidness of the American rule-based approach, the UK has long featured a flexible principles-based 
approach in its corporate governance reforms. Given the complex nature of governance practice, company 
law statutes in the UK, including the 701-page long Companies Act 2006, provide minimal regulation of cor-
porate governance. Key governance issues, such as the powers and structure of the board, are mainly left to 
the discretions of corporations and influences of semi-autonomous bodies. 'Much of governance goes be-
yond legal framework ... Hence the development of the self-regulatory governance framework in the UK 
through various reports ... make boards of directors more accountable to shareholders.'30 It is also argued 
that the flexibility of self-regulations could reflect businesses' urgent needs and avoid the high costs and 
countless administrative procedures by the amendment of existing mandatory laws, which is particularly fa-
vourable in the post-crisis period when there are increasing calls for reform. On the basis of path depend-
ence theory, which argues continuing systematic persistence, it is anticipated that self-regulation is likely to 
continue to be favoured in the realm of UK post-crisis corporate governance. 
 
POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS POST-CRISIS 
 
ENHANCING DIRECTORS' ACCOUNTABILITY TO SHAREHOLDERS 
 
The significance of internal governance over complex financial products has repeatedly been neglected in 
past practice. Over the last ten years the major thrust of corporate governance reform after corporate col-
lapses has been the improvement of external monitoring mechanisms, including the increasing use of 
non-executive directors and stringent rules regarding auditing committees. However, the significance of in-
ternal control mechanisms, in particular, appropriate risk management performance and the enhancement of 
directors' accountability by boards of directors -- failed to be adequately appreciated. In light of recent finan-
cial turmoil, it seems necessary that the scope of the existing UK statutory standard for directors' reasonable 
care, skill and diligence -- s 174 of the Companies Act 2006 -- should be further extended to require directors 
to constantly acquire and update the necessary knowledge and skills, so that they can handle increasing and 
varying risks from the rapidly changing business reality. 
Raising the standard of reasonable care and diligence required from directors in order to keep pace with the 
changing practice and expectations of the commercial community is a strategy that has recently been sup-
ported by a number of Commonwealth authorities. It was stated in the Australian case Commonwealth Bank 
of Australia v Friedrich that:31 
 
'As the complexity of commerce has gradually intensified (for better or for worse) the community has of ne-
cessity come to expect more than formerly from directors whose task it is to govern the affairs of companies 
to which large sums of money are committed by way of equity capital or loan ... In particular, the stage has 
been reached when a director is expected to be capable of understanding his company's affairs to the extent 
of actually reaching a reasonably informed opinion of its financial capacity...' 
 
 
A similar view can also be found in Daniels t/a Deloitte Haskins & Sells v AWA Ltd,32 in which the court em-
phasised that the standard used to judge directors' skills and experience should be raised accordingly as 
commercial situations became more and more complicated. This leads to the conclusion that in the recent 
Northern Rock crisis, the practice of some directors could be considered as a breach of their duty of reason-
able care and diligence. 'A fundamental role of the board is to provide oversight, direction and control but 
also to challenge where necessary.'33 Directors of Northern Rock failed to meet this basic standard with re-
gard to providing sufficient monitoring of credit products. In addition, if it is proved, the claim made by the UK 
Shareholders' Association ('UKSA') that Northern Rock directors 'duped' investors into buying shares by fail-
ing to make clear that the company was in financial difficulty will be strong evidence that the directors failed 
in exercising their statutory duty. 'Companies have an obligation to announce significant price sensitive in-
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formation as soon as possible and we believe the lack of any such announcements led to a false market in 
shares of the company.'34 
The other potential method of enhancing directors' accountability is via the development of voluntary corpo-
rate governance codes and guidelines offering sufficient flexibility and space for improvement. It is suggested 
that further corporate governance guidance for directors should be developed to take account of rising risks, 
control malfunctions and market expectations exposed by the financial crisis. Significantly, based on the 
recognition that 'a company's system of internal control has a key role of the management of risks that are 
significant to the fulfilment of its business objectives ... and the safeguarding of (shareholders') assets',35 fur-
ther risk management and internal control standards are expected on the basis of the Turnbull Report,36 to 
ensure that the risks emerging from the complicated financial environment will be adequately and effectively 
managed. 
 
ENHANCING SHAREHOLDER CONTROL: THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 
 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the role of shareholders in corporate control, and in particular the ac-
tivism of long-term institutional investors, should be emphasised as a major crisis-avoidance tool. Currently in 
the UK there is no mandatory requirement for institutional investors to vote in corporate governance. Further 
regulations are expected in the post-crisis context, requiring institutions with holdings of shares above a cer-
tain (large) minimum value to vote on company business.37 Meanwhile, the role of institutional investors in 
monitoring executive remuneration practice should be enhanced after the crisis, acting as an effective brake 
on executives' lack of accountability. As monitors of excessive and uncontrolled corporate powers, share-
holders in UK-listed companies should be able to intervene in the company's executive compensation ar-
rangements to a greater extent, thus to prevent the risk of executives exploiting principals' interests.38 For 
instance, the practice of obtaining advisory votes from shareholders regarding remuneration schemes should 





Three key theories -- the agency theory, stewardship theory and path dependence theory have served to 
explain the relationship between directors and shareholders in the field of corporate governance. Neverthe-
less, none of the theories alone seems to have stood the test of the global financial crisis. Though agency 
theory provides an effective explanation of relevant governance problems such as unaccountability of the 
directors and insufficient shareholder control, it fails to solve the governance dilemma, ie, directors cannot 
submit every decision for shareholders' consideration. A governance structure which is framed purely on the 
basis of stewardship has also proved to be inapplicable in the post-crisis context. A multi-theoretical ap-
proach to corporate governance, as advocated by Daily et al,40 therefore is essential in considering and de-
termining rules and regulations in the post-crisis context. 
Since the onset of the crisis, most recommendations in the realm of UK corporate governance have been 
constituted in the form of voluntary codes and reports, including the publication of the independent review of 
corporate governance -- the Walker Review,41 updates to the Higgs Guidance and the revisions to the Code 
(now renamed the UK Corporate Governance Code). This indicates the strong impact of the UK historical 
self-regulatory framework, as indicated by path dependence theory. The choice of adopting those recom-
mendations will be left to the decision of individual boards in the post-crisis context. But due to the lack of 
essential toughness, such a principles-based approach might not give rise to a substantial improvement in 
governance practice. In the authors' opinion, a combination of voluntary codes and mandatory instruments 
appears to be the best choice in restoring the market order and investors' confidence. The voluntary codes 
are playing the supporting role for the ultimate production of the regulation. In particular, it is necessary, via 
further judicial interpretations to s 174 and other related statutory provisions, to force directors to constantly 
upgrade necessary skills and knowledge to enable them to be more confident in dealing with more compli-
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